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Optimal Parameter Encoding Based on Worst Case
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Abstract—In this letter, optimal deterministic encoding of a uni-
formly distributed scalar parameter is performed in the presence
of an eavesdropper. The objective is to maximize the worst case
Fisher information of the parameter at the intended receiver while
keeping the mean-squared error (MSE) at the eavesdropper above
a certain level. The eavesdropper is modeled to employ the lin-
ear minimum MSE estimator based on the encoded version of the
parameter. First, the optimal encoding function is derived when
there exist no secrecy constraints. Next, to obtain the solution of
the problem in the presence of the secrecy constraint, the form of
the encoding function that maximizes the MSE at the eavesdropper
is explicitly derived for any given level of worst case Fisher infor-
mation. Then, based on this result, a low-complexity algorithm is
provided to calculate the optimal encoding function for the given
secrecy constraint. Finally, numerical examples are presented.
Index Terms—Fisher information, mean-squared error (MSE),
optimization, parameter estimation, secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL layer secrecy has gained a renewed interestwith the advances in wireless communication systems.
The main objective of physical layer secrecy is to ensure se-
cret communications between a transmitter and an intended
receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper by exploiting phys-
ical channel characteristics. One common approach to quantify
the amount of achieved secrecy is to use information theoretic
metrics, such as the mutual information and secrecy rate, which
have been investigated in a multitude of studies in the literature
for various channels (e.g., fading, Gaussian broadcast or inter-
ference, wiretap, etc. [1]–[7]) and transmission scenarios (e.g.,
with user or jammer cooperation to facilitate security [8]–[10]).
Alternatively, quality-of-service frameworks based on signal-
to-noise-ratio [11]–[13] or estimation theoretic tools, such as
mean-squared error (MSE) have recently been used to measure
the security performance of communication systems. The lat-
ter framework is of particular interest to design low-complexity
practical secure systems and has been adopted in various studies
[14]–[18]. In [14], the secret communication problem is inves-
tigated for Gaussian interference channels in the presence of
eavesdroppers. The problem is formulated to minimize the total
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minimum MSE (MMSE) at the intended receivers while keep-
ing the MMSE at the eavesdroppers above a certain level, where
joint artificial noise and linear precoding schemes are used to
satisfy the secrecy constraints. The estimation theoretic secrecy
is also employed in distributed inference networks, where the
information coming to a fusion center from various sensor nodes
can also be observed by eavesdroppers [15].
In estimation theoretic approaches, the Cramér–Rao bounds
(CRBs) provide useful fundamental limits for assessing perfor-
mance of estimators, hence they can be employed as a perfor-
mance metric for the intended receiver to optimize [16], [19]. In
this regard, the optimal parameter encoding for secret commu-
nication is investigated based on the expectation of conditional
CRB (ECRB) in [16]. In particular, the optimal encoding func-
tion is obtained to minimize the ECRB at the intended receiver,
while keeping the MSE at the eavesdropper above a certain
threshold. Instead of the ECRB metric employed in [16], this
letter focuses on the worst case CRB (equivalently, the worst
case Fisher information) in order to develop a robust parameter
encoding approach that guarantees a certain level of estimation
accuracy at the intended receiver. The proposed problem re-
quires different solution approaches than that in [16] due to the
minimax nature of the worst case optimization.
In this letter, we investigate the transmission of a uniformly
distributed scalar parameter to an intended receiver in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper. To facilitate secret communications,
we utilize an encoding function applied on the original param-
eter. The objective is to minimize the maximum CRB (equiv-
alently, to maximize the minimum Fisher information) at the
intended receiver while ensuring a certain MSE target at the
eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is modeled to employ the lin-
ear MMSE (LMMSE) estimator based on the noisy observation
of the encoded parameter without being aware of encoding. An
optimization problem is formulated to obtain the optimal encod-
ing function for a given target MSE level at the eavesdropper.
First, the secrecy constraint is omitted and the optimization
problem is solved under no constraints, which yields a closed-
form analytical solution. Then, to solve the optimal encoding
problem in the presence of the MSE constraint on the eavesdrop-
per, the optimal encoding function that maximizes the MSE at
the eavesdropper is derived analytically for any given level of
minimum Fisher information at the intended receiver. Based on
this analytical result, a low-complexity algorithm is proposed to
obtain the solution of the proposed problem.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A scalar parameter θ ∈ Λ is to be transmitted to an intended
receiver over a noisy channel, where the channel noise is rep-
resented by Nr and the instantaneous fading coefficient of the
channel is denoted by constant hr . In addition, there exists
an eavesdropper that tries to estimate the parameter, θ [16].
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The objective is to perform accurate estimation of the param-
eter at the intended receiver while keeping the estimation er-
ror at the eavesdropper above a certain level. Therefore, the
parameter is encoded by a continuous (except at a finite num-
ber of points), real valued, and one-to-one function f : Λ → Γ.
Then, the received signal at the intended receiver is expressed as
Y = hrf(θ) + Nr , where Nr is modeled as a zero-mean Gaus-
sian random variable with a variance of σ2r and is independent of
θ. Also, it is assumed that θ has uniform distribution over Λ. On
the other hand, the eavesdropper observes Z = hef(θ) + Ne ,
where Ne is zero-mean Gaussian noise with a variance of σ2e ,
which is independent of θ, and he is the fading coefficient for
the eavesdropper [2], [3]. The intended receiver tries to estimate
parameter θ by using observation Y, whereas the eavesdropper
employs observation Z for estimating θ (see Fig. 1 in [16] for
the system model).
A robust approach is proposed in this letter for the optimal
parameter encoding design and the worst case (maximum) CRB
is used for quantifying the estimation accuracy at the intended
receiver. Namely, the aim is to minimize the maximum CRB
over the parameter set via an encoding function while keep-
ing the MSE at the eavesdropper (which employs the LMMSE
estimator) above a certain target value. Hence, the following
problem formulation is proposed








(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2) ≥ η (1)
where β̂(Z) is the LMMSE estimator employed at the eaves-
dropper, η is the MSE target for the eavesdropper, (I(θ))−1 rep-
resents the CRB, and I(θ) denotes the Fisher information, which
is given by I(θ) =
∫ ( ∂ log pY |θ (y )
∂θ
)2
pY |θ (y)dy with pY |θ (y)
representing the conditional probability density function of Y
for a given value of θ [19]. The problem in (1) can also be stated
as





(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2) ≥ η (2)
which means that the aim is to maximize the minimum (worst
case) Fisher information at the intended receiver. It is noted that
the distribution of θ does not affect the objective function in (2)
since the worst case parameter value is the main concern.
As motivated in [16], the parameter space and the intrinsic
constraints on the encoding function f are specified as follows:
1) θ ∈ Λ = [a, b], 2) f(θ) ∈ [a, b], and 3) f is a continuous
(except at a finite number of points) and one-to-one function.
III. OPTIMAL ENCODING FUNCTION
In this section, the solution of the proposed problem in (2)
[equivalently, in (1)] is investigated in the absence and presence
of the secrecy constraint. To that end, the Fisher information for
parameter θ can be obtained as follows [16]:
I(θ) = h2r f
′(θ)2/σ2r (3)
where f ′(θ) denotes the derivative of f(θ).
A. Optimization Without Secrecy Constraint
Consider the optimization problem in (2) without the secrecy
constraint; i.e., in the absence of the eavesdropper. From (3),
the problem in (2) can be expressed by removing the constant
terms as




f ′(θ)2 . (4)
The following proposition is related to the solutions of (4).
Proposition 1: The optimal continuous encoding functions
in the absence of an eavesdropper are f(θ) = a + b − θ and
f(θ) = θ.
Proof: Let T denote an operator on f(θ) such that T (f) =
minθ f ′(θ)2 . It is given that f is one-to-one but not necessarily
a monotone function over [a, b] due to the possibility of dis-
continuous points. However, f has to be monotone over the
interval between any two consecutive discontinuous points as
it is one-to-one. Thus, for any one-to-one function f , there ex-
ists a monotone function fm such that T (f) = T (fm ), which
can be generated by adjusting the signs of the derivatives with-
out changing their absolute values. Hence, it can be assumed
without loss of generality that f is a monotone function. Fur-
thermore, it is noted that since f is not differentiable at discon-
tinuous points and T (f) is the pointwise minimum of f ′(θ)2 , the
points at which the jumps occur cannot be the optimal points.
Therefore, one can remove the jumps at the discontinuities to
obtain a continuous version, denoted by fc . Thus, for any one-
to-one function f , there exists a continuous function fc such
that T (f) = T (fc); hence, it can also be assumed that f is a
continuous function without any loss. First, consider the case
of f ′(θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [a, b]. Then, based on the properties of the




dθ dθ = f(b) − f(a) ≤ b − a. Let g(θ)
be defined as g(θ)  f ′(θ). Then, the problem in (4) becomes
maxg minθ g(θ)2 subject to
∫ b
a g(θ)dθ ≤ b − a and g(θ) > 0.
Consider the function g∗(θ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ [a, b], which satisfies
both of the constraints. Next, suppose that there exists a func-
tion h with minθ h(θ) > 1. Then,
∫ b
a h(θ)dθ > b − a, leading
to a violation of the constraint. Hence, for any given function
g, there is an upper bound specified as minθ g(θ) ≤ 1. Since
the constant function satisfies this upper bound, it is the maxi-
mizer over all possible functions. Since g(θ) = 1 for θ ∈ [a, b],
it is obtained that f(θ) = θ is an optimal solution. For the
case of f ′(θ) < 0, let g(θ)  −f ′(θ). Then, based on similar
arguments, g(θ) = 1 can be obtained, resulting in an optimal
solution of f(θ) = a + b − θ.1 
Proposition 1 reveals that if there exist no secrecy constraints,
parameter encoding does not provide any benefits in terms of
the worst case Fisher information as f(θ) = θ is optimal.
B. Optimization With Secrecy Constraint
To obtain the optimal encoding function in the presence of
the secrecy constraint, the problem in (2) can be rewritten, based
on (3), as




f ′(θ)2 s.t. E
(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2) ≥ η (5)
where the additional constraints on the parameter domain and
the encoding function are as stated at the end of Section II. Since
the eavesdropper employs the LMMSE estimator, the MSE
at the eavesdropper can be expressed as [16]
E
(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2) = h
2V (V − 2C)
h2V + 1
+ (E(X) − E(θ))2
+Var(θ) (6)
where X = f(θ), V = Var(X), C = Cov(X, θ), and h =
he/σe .2 From (5), it is noted that the optimal encoding func-
1The solution set for (4) also contains the set of all one-to-one functions on
[a, b] with f (θ) ∈ [a, b] and with finitely many discontinuous points, where
between any two consecutive discontinuities, |f ′(θ)| = 1. Hence, there exist
infinitely many encoding functions that solve (4). The encoding functions in
Proposition 1 correspond to the optimal continuous solutions.
2It is noted from (5) and (6) that the transmitter requires the knowledge of the
channel quality parameter for the eavesdropper, h, which can be challenging
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tion should satisfy the MMSE constraint by making the small-
est slope in [a, b] as large as possible. It is known that when
the secrecy constraint is not effective (or, removed), the linear
encoding function is optimal according to Proposition 1, and
|f ′opt(θ)| = 1. Therefore, for a given target level η in (5), one
strategy to find the optimal encoding function is to search among
eligible encoding functions that satisfy minθ∈[a,b] |f ′(θ)| = k
and to check if any of them satisfies the target secrecy level,
where k is set to 1 initially. If there exist no solutions for a given
k, then k is decreased and the procedure is repeated, until a fea-
sible function satisfying the secrecy constraint is found. Let Fk
denote the family of one-to-one and continuous (except at a fi-
nite number of points) functions with the domain and codomain
being given by [a, b], and minθ |f ′(θ)| = k. Then, a sufficient
condition for optimality of f ∈ Fk is that it should satisfy the
secrecy constraint and there should be no elements in Fm that
satisfy the secrecy constraint for m > k. To determine whether
the secrecy constraint can be satisfied for a given k, the highest
MMSE at the eavesdropper has to be calculated for that specific
value of k. Hence, the solution of the following optimization
problem should be performed in the first step:
f̂opt = arg max
f̂
E
(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2) s.t. k ≤ ∣∣f̂ ′(θ)∣∣,∀θ ∈ [a, b]
(7)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 is a given parameter.
Remark 1: The domain of the parameter is taken to be Λ =
[a, b] in the general case. However, due to Proposition 2 in [16], it
can be assumed that Λ = [0, γ] and f̂(θ) : [0, γ] → [0, γ], where
γ = b − a, without loss of generality. Hence, in the rest of the
manuscript, θ is assumed to be distributed uniformly in [0, γ].
The following result characterizes the solution of (7).




γ − θk, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ α
γk − θk, if α < θ ≤ γ . (8)
Furthermore, if 2 − h2 γ 212 (2k − k2) ≥ (k + 1)(h2Vmin +
1)(h2Vmax + 1), where h is the channel quality for the
eavesdropper, Vmin = k
2 γ 2
12 and Vmax =




then, both α = 0 and α = γ are optimal α values. Otherwise,
α = γ/2 is optimal.
Proof: The first step in the proof is to specify the charac-
teristics of the encoding function that maximizes the LMMSE.
Note that f(θ) = X results in a random variable with V =
Var(X), C = Cov(X, θ) and μ = E(X), and the value of
E(|β̂(Z) − θ|2) depends on these values. Hence, the LMMSE
value is to be maximized over the possible values of V , C, and
μ. It is noted that the slope constraint induces limitations on
the possible values of μ, V , and C. Let Sk denote the feasible
set of μ, V , and C values in the presence of the constraint k ≤
|f ′(θ)|. As parameter θ is distributed uniformly on the interval
[0, γ], E(θ) = γ/2 and Var(θ) = γ2/12. Then, the optimiza-
tion problem in (7) can be expressed as maxμ,V ,C
h2 V (V −2C )




12 , (μ, V,C) ∈ Sk . After some manipulation, the
objective function in this optimization problem can be stated
as λ(V )E(|X − θ|2) + (1 − λ(V ))(μ2 − γμ + γ2/3), where
λ(V )  h2V /(h2V + 1). Note that for a given μ, E(|X − θ|2)
can be maximized, which would yield an upper bound on the
to obtain accurately. Based on imperfect knowledge of h, the parameter en-
coding design can be performed, for example, by considering the minimum
possible value of the MSE at the eavesdropper according to the uncertainty in
the parameter (Remark 3 in [16]).
objective function. It can be found by inspection that when the




γ − θk, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ α
γk − θk, if α < θ ≤ γ (9)
where (1 − k)α = μ − kγ/2 and kγ/2 ≤ μ ≤ γ − kγ/2.
Hence, the following the relationship is obtained
E
(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2) ≤ λ(V )β1(α, k) + (1 − λ(V ))β2(α, k)
= λ(V )(β1(α, k) − β2(α, k)) + β2(α, k) (10)
with β1(α, k)  (k2 − 1)(α2 − γα) + (k2 − k + 1)γ2/3 and
β2(α, k)  (k − 1)2(α2 − γα) + (3k2/4 − 3k/2 + 1)γ2/3.
Now, notice that for a fixed k, the following equality holds:









Since β1(α, k) is a concave function of α and β2(α, k) is
a convex function of α for 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, β1(α, k) − β2(α, k)
is a concave function of α; hence, it attains its minimum
at α = 0 and α = γ. Therefore, the following inequality
is obtained: β1(α, k) − β2(α, k) ≥ (k2/4 + k/2)γ2/3 ≥ 0,
which implies that for a given value of μ, the right-hand-side
of (10) is an increasing function of λ(V ). Hence, a further
upper bound can be obtained for (10) by using the same
X̂α defined above since it maximizes the variance under
the slope constraint. For this function, the variance is given
by V (α, k) = (k − 1)(α2 − αγ) + k2γ2/12. It is noted that
λ(V (α, k)) and the resulting upper bound are functions of α
for fixed k and h. Hence, the upper bound can be maximized
over α as follows:
E
(∣∣β̂(Z) − θ∣∣2)
≤ λ(V (α, k))β1(α, k) + (1 − λ(V (α, k)))β2(α, k)
= λ(V (α, k))(β1(α, k) − β2(α, k)) + β2(α, k)
 g(α, k) ≤ max
α∈[0,γ ]
g(α, k). (11)
If α̂ = arg maxα∈[0,γ ] g(α, k), then E(|β̂(Z) − θ|2) achieves
this upper bound by employing α̂ at the encoding function.
Therefore, the optimal encoding function is X̂α̂ , where α̂ =
arg maxα∈[0,γ ] g(α, k).
To conclude the proof, α̂ should be characterized for given k




h2V (α, k) + 1
(β1(α, k) − β2(α, k)) + β2(α, k) (12)
where h, γ > 0 and k ∈ [0, 1]. Instead of optimizing over α, the
optimization can be performed over V based on a change of
variables by noting that for α ∈ [0, γ], V (α, k) ∈ [Vmin , Vmax],
where Vmin = k2γ2/12 and Vmax = k2γ2/12 + (1 − k)γ2/4.
Then, (12) is rewritten as
max
V ∈[Vm in ,Vm a x ]
z(V ) =
h2(k + 1)V 2 + HV + F
h2V + 1
(13)
where H = (h2γ2/12)(4 − 4k + 3k2 − k3) + k − 1 and F =
(γ2/12)(4 − 6k + 4k2 − k3). Then, according to the Weier-
strass theorem, the global maximum exists for (13), and
the solution can be found by applying Fermat’s rule.
Namely, the optimal solution either satisfies z′(V ) = 0
or is at the boundary, i.e., V = Vmin or V = Vmax .
For z′(V ) = 0, V 2 + 2V/h2 + d/h4 = 0, where d = (H −
Fh2)/(k + 1). Then, V̂ = −h−2 + h−2√1 − d is a candi-
date solution. However, V̂ should belong to [Vmin , Vmax].
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To guarantee this condition, h2Vmax ≥
√
1 − d − 1 ≥ h2Vmin
should be satisfied. Therefore, h2Vmin + 1 ≤
√
1 − d. If this
holds, then sgn(limV →V +m in z
′(V ) = sgn(V 2min + 2h
−2Vmin +
h−4d) ≤ 0. In conclusion, it is possible that a candidate so-
lution is inside the feasible interval [Vmin , Vmax]; however,
there is only one such solution and V is decreasing at the
beginning of the interval. Due to continuity, it is noted that
if V̂ ∈ (Vmin , Vmax), then it is in fact the global minimum.
Hence, it is concluded that the solution of (13) is either Vmin or
Vmax , excluding the possibility of the other case. Finally, the re-
gions in which a certain end point is optimal are characterized.
The condition of z(Vmin) ≥ z(Vmax) occurs if h and k sat-
isfy 2 − h2 γ 212 (2k − k2) ≥ (k + 1)(h2Vmin + 1)(h2Vmax + 1)
and z(Vmin) < z(Vmax) holds otherwise. Note that if the op-
timal solution is Vmax , then α̂ = γ/2. If the optimal solution is
Vmin , both α̂ = 0 and α̂ = γ are the optimal solutions. 
As the form of the optimal encoding function that maximizes
the LMMSE at the eavesdropper is derived for any value of the
minimum slope constraint (k) via Proposition 2, the optimal
encoding function based on the worst case Fisher information
metric can be obtained by finding the maximum of such con-
straints. Hence, the problem reduces to the determination of the
best (maximum) value of k ∈ (0, 1] such that ∃f ∈ Fk in the
form specified by (8) that satisfies the secrecy constraint. This
approach can be implemented by using the procedure shown in
Algorithm 1. It is noted that E(|β̂(X̂α ) − θ|2) in Algorithm 1
can be calculated explicitly via (6) and (8).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
In this section, a numerical example is provided based on the
theoretical results and the proposed algorithm in Section III. The
channel parameters are selected as hr = σr = 1 for the intended
receiver and h = 0.5 and h = 1.5 for the eavesdropper. The pa-
rameter θ is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the interval
of [0, 2]; i.e., γ = 2. The eavesdropper employs the LMMSE es-
timator by using the observations based on the encoded parame-
ter X = f(θ). Also, Δ is set to 0.001 in the proposed algorithm
for calculating the optimal encoding functions. In Fig. 1, the
worst case Fisher information values achieved by the proposed
algorithm are presented with respect to the target secrecy level
for h = 0.5 and h = 1.5. For comparison purposes, the worst
case Fisher information values corresponding to the ECRB
based encoding algorithm in [16] are also provided in the same
figure. (The proposed scheme provides higher worst case Fisher
Fig. 1. Worst case Fisher information versus η.
Fig. 2. fopt (θ) versus θ for h = 0.5.
information than the ECRB based scheme since the latter aims
to optimize the average CRB.) In Fig. 2, the optimal encoding
functions based on the worst case Fisher information metric are
provided for various η values for h = 0.5. As justified in Propo-
sition 2, the optimal encoding function is either linear with a
certain slope between 0 and 1, or piecewise linear with a single
discontinuity at θ = γ/2 depending on the target secrecy level η.
In Fig. 1, it is observed that as the target secrecy level in-
creases, the worst case Fisher information achieved by the
proposed algorithm decreases, as expected. In addition, it is
possible to obtain higher worst case Fisher information val-
ues when h = 1.5 for the same MSE target compared to the
case of h = 0.5 since the distortion due to the encoding is
transmitted to the eavesdropper more effectively under better
channel conditions. Note that when h = 0.5, the three differ-
ent regions are observable in the performance figure. When
η ≤ η1 = 16/39 = 0.4101, employing k = 1, that is, fopt(θ) =
γ − θ, is sufficient to attain the target secrecy levels. In general,
η1 can be found as η1 = 0.25γ2
(
h2γ2/(h2γ2 + 12) + 1/3
)
.
When η1 < η ≤ η2 with η2 = 0.4708, it is observed that the
optimal α value becomes γ/2. It is noted that η2 can be found
by determining the point at which the inequality in Proposition
2 becomes an equality in general. Therefore, in this region, the
optimal encoding function has a single discontinuity at θ = γ/2.
Finally, when η2 < η ≤ 4/3, the optimal α is 0; hence, the op-
timal encoding function is linear with no discontinuities. It is
interesting to note that the worst case Fisher information de-
creases faster in the second region, and it decays to zero in the
third region more slowly as compared to the second region. On
the other hand, when h = 1.5, only two of such regions are
observed in Fig. 1.
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